State of Utah v. E. Odell Stanley : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
State of Utah v. E. Odell Stanley : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Attorney for Respondent.
E. Odell Stanely; Appellant Pro se.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation





DOCKET NO, i^.1^* • 
IN THE COURT OP APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff • Respondent 
v. 
E. ODELL STANLEY 
Defendant - Appellant 
Case No, 890185 - CA 
Category No, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
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Utah Code Annotated 58_-^ 2_-2_B _[4J_ _[A]_ as amended: 
Mary- . 
(4) Practice of Medicine means: C/er/< ~ 
y^hCc 
(a) To diagnose, treat, correct, advise, or prescribe fro any 
huiran disease, ailment, injury, infirmity, deformity, pain or other condition 
physical or mental, real or imaginary or to attempt to do so by any means 
by instrumentality. 
Utah Code Annotated 58-12-30 tJ.C.A. Medical Practice Act. 
Practice of Medicine without a_ License - a. Felony 
A FELONY ~ EXCEPTIONS. 
It is unlawful to engage in the practice of medicine in this state 
without first obtaining a license shall be guilty of; except the following 
persons MAY ENGAGE IN ACTIVITIES INCLUDED IN THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 
SUBJECT TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND LIMITATIONS STATED: 
(5) any individual administration a domestic or family remedy 
including those persons engaged in the sale of vitamins, health 
food or health food supplements, herb or other products of 
nature, except drugs or medicine for which an authorized 
prescription is required by law. 
Utah Code Annotated 76-23a-l £.C.A. 
to safeguard the privacy of innocent persons, the interception of 
wire or oral communications when none of the parties to the communication has 
consented to the interception OILY WHEN AUTHORIZED BY A COURT OF THE COMPETENT 
JURISDICTION and should remain under the control and supervision of the 
authorizing court, interception of wire and oral communications should 
further be limited to certain major types of offenses and specific catagories 
of crimes with assurance that the interception is justified and that the 
information abtained thereby NOT BE misused. 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated 77-^-26 (b) (1) (1953 as amended) and 78-2a-3 (e) (1953) (as 
amended) under which provisions a defendant is a criminal case may appeal 
th the Utah Court of Appeals from a Final Judgement where, as in the instant 
case, there is no conviction of a. First Degree Felony nor a Capitol Felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Was the Appellant a recipient of such sub-standard legal representation 
as to entitled him to relief under the second prong of Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)? 
2. Was the Trial Court Divested of subject matter jurisdiction when the 
state preoecuted the Appellant under a statute that did not clearly 
cover the case? 
3. Was the Appellant convicted without evidence of his guilt? 
4. Are the provisions which purportedly cover the offense of "Pyramid 
Schemes" and coded 76-6a-3 U.C.A. unconstitutionally void for vagueness? 
TEXT OF STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated 76-12-28 (4) (A) as amended: 
(4) Practice of Medicine means: 
(a) To diagnose, treat, correct, advise, or prescribe fro any 
human disease, ailment, injury, infirmity, deformity, pain or other condition 
physical or mental, real or imaginary or to attempt to do so by any means 
by instrumentality. 
Utah Code Annotated 76-12-30 U..C.A. Medical Practice Act. 
Practice of Medicine without a. License - a. Felony 
A FELONY - EXCEPTIONS. 
It is unlawful to engage in the practice of medicine in this state 
without first obtaining a license shall be guilty of; except the following 
persons MAY ENGAGE IN ACTIVITIES INCLUDED IN THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 
SUBJECT TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND LIMITATIONS STATED: 
(5) any individual administration a domestic or family remedy 
including those persons engaged in the sale of vitamins, health 
food or health food supplements, herb or other products of 
nature, except drugs or medicine for which an authorized 
prescription is required by law. 
Utah Code Annotated 76-23a-l £.C.A. 
to safeguard the privacy of innocent persons, the interception of 
wire or oral communications when none of the parties to the communication has 
consented to the interception ONLY WHEN AUTHORIZED BY A COURT OF THE COMPETENT 
JURISDICTION and should remain under the control and supervision of the 
authorizing court, interception of wire and oral communications should 
further be limited to certain major types of offenses and specific categories 
of crimes with assurance that the interception is justified and that the 
information abtained thereby NOT BE misused. 
Utah Code Annotated 76-23a-4 U.C.A. 
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter 
any person who does any of the following is GUILTY OF A THIRD DEGREE FELONY. 
(c) willfully discloses or endeavors to disclose to any other 
person the contents of wire or oral communications knowing or having reason 
to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire 
or oral communication in violation of this sub-section. 
Utah Code Annotated 7723a-7 as amended 
"Whenever any wire or oral communicationhas been 
intercepted, no part of the contents of the communication and 
no evidence derived therefrom may be recieved in evidence in 
any trial, hearing or other proceeding in or before any court, 
Grand Jury, Department, Officer, Agency, Regulatory body, 
Legislative Committee or other authority of the State or Political 
Subdivision thereof if the disclosure of that information would 
be in violation of this chapter. 
Utah Code Annotated 77-23a-8 as amended 
The Attorney General of the State of Utah or any 
Assistant Attorney General specifically designated by the Attorney 
General or any County Attorney or any Deputy County Attorney 
specifically designated by the County Attorney may authorize 
an application of a Utah State District Court Judge of competent 
Jurisdiction for and the Judge may grant in conformity with the 
procedure for interception of wire or oral communication by any 
law enforcement agency of this state or any political sug-
division having responsibility for the investigation of the type 
of offense regarding which the application is made. When the 
ionterception sought may provide or has provided evidence of: 
(1) any crime punishable by death or imprisonment 
for more that one (1) year in the Utah State Prison. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v* 
E. ODELL STANLEY, 
Defendant-Appe1lant. 
Case No. 890185 - CA 
Category No. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A jury convicted the Appellant, E. Odell Stanley, of the ofenses of 
(a) "Operating a pyramid scheme", a third degree felony in violation of 
76-6a-3 U..C.A., and (b) "Practicing Medicine without a License", a third 
degree felony in violation of 58-12-28(4)(a) £.C.A. Mr. Stanley appeals 
from a judgement and conviction of the said offenses that was rendered in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court, County of Utah, State of Utah, Honorable Boyd 
L. Park, Judge presiding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Sometime during the month of March, 1988 the appellant recieved 
a telephone call from Rosamunde C. Krolls of Provo, Utah who wanted the 
appellant to go to her residence and treat her for so-called "High-Blood Pressure", 
(T. 45). 
Under oath, the said Mrs. Krolls admitted that an "Investigator 
for the Utah County Attorney!s Office" named Frank D. Wall had "wired" the 
residence of the said Mrs Kroll (T. 49) , in order to have Mrs. Kroll lull 
the appellant (Mr. Stanley) into "a False Sense of Security" and thereby 
illegally obtain evidence upon which prosectuion could base its charge and 
only upon such recorded visit to the Kroll!s residence at Mrs. Krolls request 
was the charge of "Practicing Medicine without a. License" erroneously filed 
against the appellant and pursuant to which lawlessly recorded session 
(requested session) between the appellant and the said Mrs. Krolls the appellant 
was unconstitutionally convicted. 
Mrs. Krolls further testified that her daughter, who was an employee 
of the Utah County Attorney who called her and told her to call the appellant 
(T. 45) / and thus subject him to the aforesaid set-up for the prosecution 
by the Utah County Attorney's Office of the appellant for the improvised 
charges of "Parcticing Medicine without a. License" and "Operating a. Pyramid 
Scheme". Mrs. Krolls testified to buying a bottle of distilled water (Hyro 
peroxide) (T. 46) and was aware of the tape recording (T. 52). 
The Utah County Attorneyfs Investigator, a Frank D. Wall who 
testified that he was a policeman "for 17 years" (T. 53), admitted that he 
"personally" arranged "the tape recording" of the fake "treatment" needed by 
the said Mrs. Krolls (T. 53). 
However, a close examination of both the testimony and tape 
recording of Mr. Stanley's requested (set-up) visit to Mrs Krolls home (T. 45) 
fails to revel that such lawless recorded interview of Mrs. Krolls in 
violation of 76-23a-l and 76-23a-4 (c) £.C.A. provided any reasonable 
ascertainable evidentiary basis upon which the appellants conviction could 
constitutionally stand. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
First, the instant case is obviously based upon the self-imposed 
blindness of Defense Counsel who refused to see the County Attorney's 
employment of a variation on a Police Entrapment tactic that has been 
dignified with the name of "Sting Operation"; the significance being an 
ex-policeman who testified under oath that his name was Frank D. Wall and he 
had been a. policeman for 17 years, (T. 53) but had been an "Investigator" for 
the Utah County Attorney's Office for the past 18 months (T. 53) and that he 
had personally arranged for the recording of the oral communications between 
the appellant Stanley and the said Mrs. Krolls (at the Krolls private 
residence) and above all such lawless Recording was set-up by the said 
"Investigator" Frank D. Wall (T. 53) with the (a) required authorization and 
supervision of a Court per 76-23a-l £.C.A., nor the consent of appellant 
Stanley, and (b) such deceptive recording was done with the full knowledge of 
the said Mrs. Krolls (at her home) (T. 50) with the knowledge that it would 
be turned over to Investigator Frank D. Wall for the prosecution of the 
appellant for the improvised charge of "Practicing Medicine without a. License" 
and such know non-Judicially approved method of eavesdropping constituted a 
"Third Degree Felony" at 76-23a-4 (<c) U..C.A. 
Above all "But for" the total self-imposed blindness of ineffective 
Defense Council the state should not have been able to profit from the "Fruits 
of its unlawfulness" via its County Attorney"s Office lawless use of evidence 
that should have been suppressed but was treated with deliberate silence or 
ignorance or both by Defense Council at critical stages of the proceedings 
against the appellant. 
Relative to the "Pyramid Scheme", its evidence is left very much 
in doubt on the face of the record and the Statutory provision purportedly 
covering such an offense is unconstitutionally viod for vagueness. 
Finally, returning to the erroneous charge of "Practicing Medicine 
without a License". The prosecution at page 3_ of the Trail Transcript moved 
the Court to "amend the Information" to charge the appellant under 58-12-28(4) 
(A) and over the objection of the Defense Council said, Motion was granted, 
(T. 3) , and by such action the Court divested itself of Jurisdiction of the 
subject-matter because the Utah Supreme Court has declared that the prosecution 
must proceed under the statute that "clearly covers the case", Ogden City v. 
McLaughlin, 5 Utah 387. 
The appellant was therefore convicted without evidence of his guilt 
and Due Process of Law at Article I, Section 7 Constitution of Utah, and the 
5th and 14th Amendments to the Federal Constitution were violated thereby. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The Appellant respectfully contends that he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel at "critical stages of the proceedings" against him, 
he was unconstitutionally convicted of both "Practicing Medicine without a 
License" and "Operating a. Pyramid Scheme". 
In support of the foregoing contention, the appellant, respectfully 
submits that while the question of "Ineffective Counsel" may ordinarily be 
inappropriately raised on "Direct Appeal". United States v. Winkle, 722 F.2d 
605-12 (10th Cir., 1983), United States v. Griffin, 699 F.2d 1102, 1107-09 
(10th Cir. 1983), and the United States Supreme Court has granted latitude 
to raise "ineffective assistance claims" collaterally. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 
106 S.Ct. 2574, 2585 (1986). 
The Appellant nevertheless respectfully submits that he does not 
bring to the captioned Court...and ordinary case...but a case in which the 
sub-standard performance of Defense Counsel was so indisputably ineffective 
clear upon the face of the Record that but for such INEFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL 
at the following specific "critical stages" of the proceedings, no "Rational 
finder of fact" could have found "Guilt beyond a reasonable doubt" as to 
"EACH ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED", 76-1-501 U.C.A, IN RE WINSHIP, 397 U.S. 
358 (1970), Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), and at this point, 
the Court's attention is especially referred to the Trial Transcript at page 44 
where: 
1. A Rosamunde C. Krolls of Provo, Utah testified that she is 
"THE MOTHER OF A BARBARA AXELGARD", secretary in the County 
Attorneyfs Office (Utah County), (lines 17 thru 24). 
2. At Trial Transcript - page 45 - the said Rosamunde C Krolls 
testified that (a) because her said daughter, Barbara had 
asked her to telephone the Appellant (who was a stranger 
to her) and invite the Appellant into her Living Room 
which she knew had been wired for recordings to be made 
(T. 45) and that (b) a Utah County Investigator (Frank G. Walls) 
had wired her living room to record the oral communications 
between herself and the Appellant. 
3. At Trial Transcript - page 53, A Frank D. Wall identifies himself 
as a "Sargent Special Investigator with the Utah County 
Attorney's Office" and (2) that he had been a police officer 
approximately 17 years and (3) an "Investigator for the 
County Attorney's Office fa year and a half" (line 8) and 
(4) HE ARRANGED THE TAPE RECORDING THAT WAS MADE AT THE TIME 
(MARCH 10, 1988) (where the appellant was at the Krolls' 
Living Room as aforesaid), (Trial Transcript page 53 lines 1-19). 
The Appellant respectfully submits that the TOTAL SILENCE and hence 
inaction of Defense Counsel relative to the LAWLESS MANNER IN WHICH the State 
totally declined to accord the "accused" (appellant) any "option" whatsoever 
in the question of whether he (the appellant) desired: 
"TO ASSIST THE STATE (IN RECORDING HIS KROLLS INTERVIEW) 
and thereby "assist the State in securing his conviction" 
ACCORD: Rationale of Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961). 
And it is so because in neither: 1. Defense Counsel!s "Motion to Dismiss" 
that covers pages 86-88 of The Trial Transcript, nor 2. Defense Counsel's 
Final Summation to the Trial Jury does Defense Counsel object to the unlawfulness 
of the recording and use at trial of the oral communications in the aforesaid 
"Living Room" of Rosamunde C. Krolls (T. 45) as "arranged by Investigator 
Frank D. Wall" (T. 53) but still "a Third Degree Felony" at 76-23a-4(l) (C) 
IJ.C.A. 
1. "Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, 
any person who does any of the following is guilty of a felony 
in the Third Degree". 
C. "willfully discloses or endeavors to disclose to any other person 
the contents of any wire or oral communication knowing or having 
reason to know that the information was obtained through the 
interception of a wire or oral communication is in 
violation of this section". 
And while the "Investigator" for the Utah County Attorney's Office (Frank G. 
Wall) bragged about "setting-up" the appellant (T. 151 and T. 158). 
The indisputable lawlessness of a mere "Investigator" for the County 
Attorneyf s Office does not satisfy the pre-requisites to the lawful1 eaves-
dropping (wire-tapping) oral communications as was unlawfully done relative 
to the appellant aforesaid being lulled to the wired living room of Rosamunde 
C. Krolls (T. 45) by the phone call of Mrs, Krolls herself (T. 45) and 
"arranged" by the said "INvestigator" Frank Wall (T. 53) without any conpliance 
with the following provisions of 77-23a-8 £.C.A. (of Record). 
77-23a-8 tJ.C.A.: The Attorney General of the State of Utah or any 
Assistant Attorney General specifically designated by the Attorney 
General or any County Attorney or any Deputy County Attorney 
specifically designated by the County Attorney may authorize 
an application to a Utah State District Court Judge of Competent 
Jurisdiction for and the Judge may grant in conformity with 
the proceedure for interception or wire or oral communication 
by any law enforcement agency of the State or any Political 
sugdivision having responsibility for the investigation of the 
type of offense regarding which the application is made, when 
the interception sought will provide or has provided evidence of: 
1. Any crime punishable by death or imprisonment for more than 
one year in the Utah State Prison. 
2. A violation of the Controlled Substance Act Chapter 37, Title 58 
or, 
3. any conspiracy to commit any of the crimes named in this section• 
And relative to the admissability of the fruit of lawless Recordations of 
oral communications such as admittedly occurred in the instant case by Mrs. 
Krolls at T. 45 and Investigator Wall at T. 53, T. 151 and T. 158. The Utah 
Legislature has clearly spelled out the following prohibitions at 77-23a-7 
Evidence Exclusion Rule: 
77-23a-7 £.£• A.: Whenever any wire or or al communication has been 
intercepted, no part of the contents of the communication and 
no evidence derived therefrom may be recieved in evidence in any 
trial, hearing or other proceeding, in or before any Court, 
Grand Jury, Department, Officer, Agency, Reglatory Body, 
Leglislative Committee of the State or other authority of the 
State or political subdivision thereof if the disclosure would be 
a violation of this chapter. 
The Appellant respectfully contends that inasmuch as the record is 
silent as to compliance with the preceding pre-requisites to valid eavesdropping 
(wire-tapping and recordation) at 77-23a-8 tJ.CZ.A.and "Waiver cannot be 
presumed from a silent record" (Carnley y. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 1962) it 
must reasonable follow, at law, therefrom that non-compliance with the requisites 
of 77-23a-8 UiC.A. was fatal to any form or use or the recorded communications 
between the appellant and Rosamunde C. Krolls (T. 45, T. 53) and the "set-up" 
of the appellant (T. 151, T. 158) admitted by the Investigator to have been 
effected by such "living room recordings" (T. 45) and the States total 
dependence upon such inadmissible evidence (per 77-23a-7 LLC.A.) should clearly 
prevent any circumvention of the inescapable fact that the so-called "practicing 
medicine without a lecense" (58-12-28-/4/ (a.) £.C.A.) being a clear and 
obvious product of inadmissible lawlessly recorded oral communications in 
violation of 77-23a-4(l) (c) tJ.C.A., 77-23a-7 £.C.A. and 77-23a-8 U.C.A., and 
for such specific reason has been unconstitutionally employed to effect the 
fataly defective conviction that is now being respectfully appealed and should 
not be allowed to stand. 
Finally, in further satisifaction the the second prong of Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) the appellant respectfully submits that 
the Supreme Court has declared the following "stages of the proceedings" 
"Critical"...at which "the guiding hand of counsel" (Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S 
45 /1932/), which is synonymous with "the effective assistance of counsel" is 
expressly required: 
1. At the Preliminary Hearing - (a state constitution right at 
Art. I Sec. 13. See: White v. State of Maryland, 373 U.S. 
59 (1963). 
2. At Arraignment - Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1962) 
3. At Trial - Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) . 
4. At Sentencing - Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 
(1968) . 
5. On Appeal - Douglas v. California, 373 U.S. 353 
(1963) . 
And relative to such "critical stages" the complete Record in the 
instant case because no room for any doubt whatsoever that 
Defense Council was (a) Deliberately unaware (indifferent), to the 
lawless recording and the use of the illegally obtained oral 
communication (in violation of 77-23a-8 U..C.A. , 77-23a-7 tJ.C.A. , 
and 77-23a-4 (1) (c) £.(:.A.), or was ignorant of such State Statutory 
provisions or both but whatever be the truth of the matter, the 
"Record is the best evidence" of the fact that the Appellant was 
indisputably denied "The Effective assistance of Counsel" at the 
forestated critical stages of the proceedings against him and in 
such specific regard, the Supreme Court said: 
"When the effective assistance of counsel 
is denied aj: a. critical stage of the 
proceedings against the accused, we will 
automatically REVERSE and will not 
listen to any nice "calculations about 
the amount of prejudice arising therefrom", 
cf. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 
(1942) . 
Left clearly without "The Guiding Hand of Counsel", 
Powell y. Alabama, Supra, and the inherent "Fundamental Fairness" 
also denied thereby (Gideon y. Wainwright, Supra), the appellant1s 
conviction should not be allowed to stand. 
POINT II 
The prosecution proceeded under the Provisions of 
58-12-28 (_4) (A) U..C..A. which merely define and hence do not 
"clearly cover" the facts of the instant case nor the controlling 
law and for such reason the subject-matter Jurisdiction of the 
Trial Court was not invoked and its judgement should be declared 
a nullity. 
The Appellant was charged under, and convicted, pursuant 
to the provisions of 58-12-28 (4) (A) £.C.A., which are worded as 
fololows: 
58-12-28 (4) (A) .U.C.A. 
(4) Practice of Medicine means: 
(a) to diagnose, treat, correct 
advise or prescribe for any human disease 
ailment, injury, informity, deformity, pain 
or other condition, physical or mental, real 
or imaginary or to attempt to do so by any 
means or instrumentality. 
Thus it is readily apparent that the above provisions 
o f
 58-12-28 (4) (A) U.C.A. merely define (define) what the phrase 
WDJ^S ct ''orac'iic' 
words of "practice of medicine" mean and as such: 
1. _Do not prescribe a. penalty, nor 
2. Recognize "conduct that is free" condemnation as 
criminal as directed by the Utah Legislature 
at 76-1-104 (2) £.C.A. and spelled out in the 
controlling statutory provision in the instant 
case at 58-12-30 (5) U..C.A. 
Turning to the applicable and controlling applicable 
Statutory porvisions (i.e. 58-12-30(5) U.C.A.) it should be first 
not that the Utah Supreme Court nor the Utah Legislature's have 
retreated from the well settled principle of law that "a crime or 
public offense must be prohibited or commanded and for which a 
penalty is provided, and both requisites (1) a pentaly and 
(2) applicable statutory section that "c/early covers the case" 
is existent in the following substance of 58-12-30 (5) £.C.A., 
58-12-30 Medical Practice Act - practice of 
medicine without a license, a felony 
Exceptions. 
NOTE: Even in the very caption above 
i.e. "practice of medicine without a. license" 
are the identical words used to charge the 
appellant and still the prosecution 
erroneously "amended" from the 
applicable provisions of 58-12-30 (5) IJ-C^ A. 
to the "definition" at 58-12-28(4)(A)tJ.C.A. 
over the objections of defense coulsel as 
follows: 
Trial Transcripts - pages 3 to 4: 
Mr. Madsen: We would move to amend, what is count no. II 
by srriking the "1" in the citation to 58-12-28(3) in its entirely 
and adding sub (4) after practicing medicine without a license., 
Mr. Harston: Well again we counted on discussing three 
and four at length and he had been held to account for that to 
date. I can't stipulate to that amendment and we would oppose 
it and would like the jury to consider all of it. 
THE COURT: Okay, the Court having heard the motion, 
amd the objection, the Court having reviewed 58-12 which is a 
medical practice act finds that it is appropriate motion on the 
part of the State to restrict the charges to 58-12-28 (4) (A) which 
is the parctice of medicine and the definition under (A) and the 
Court would hold the plaintiff to the restricted definition of 
sub-paragrapri (A) and grant the motion. The Court will change 
the amended information by interlineation to so reflect the motion 
okay. 
Thus by the Court, "restricting" the "Plaintiff"( 
(Prosecution" to "that restricted definition of sub-paragraph (A)" 
(Trial Transcript - page 4, line 2), the Trial Court thereby restricted the 
prosecution to the following substance of subsection (A)of 58-12-28. 
A. to diagnose, treat correct, advise, or prescribe for any 
human disease, ailment, injury, infirmity, deformity, 
pain or other condition, physical or mental, real or 
imaginary or attempt to do so by any means or 
instrumentality. 
did then and there expressly divest the Court of subject-matter Jurisdiction 
by its "restriction" of the prosecution to Section (A) of 58-12-28(4) (A) 
above exclusively because: 
1. 58-12-28(4) Sub-Section (A) above; 
(a) does not cover and prohibit conduct under the laws of 
the State of Utah. 
(b) Does not accord any Court of the State of Utah an expressed 
or implied latitude to punish the above listed condust 
under the "restricted" sub-section (A) as a crime or 
public offense. 
And where, as is obvious, the Trial Judge has expressed concurred in the 
incerdible motion of the Prosecuting Attorney at pages 3 and 4 of the Trial 
Transcripts and "restricted" the prosecution to the prosecution's requested 
"amendment" of the "Information" to read a violation of 58-2-28(4) (A) U..C.A. 
Still, the Trial Court acted apparently oblivious of the Utah Supreme Court's 
warning that: 
"no matter how reprehensible the condust of the accused 
may be yet no punishment can be inflicted without a law 
authorizing it and such law must clearly cover the case. 
Ogden City v. McLaughlin, 5 Utah 387. 
And therefore applied to the instant case the applicable and controlling 
provisions of 58-12-30 U..C.A. must be respected if the Trial Court's subject-
matter Jurisdiction is to be properly invoked. 
The controlling and applicable provisions of 58-12-30 U.C.A. are 
captioned and worded as follows: 
58-12-30 Medical Practice Act - Practice of Medicine without a 
License a Felony - Exceptions. 
It is unlawful to engage in the practice of medicine 
in this state without first obtaining a license is 
guilty of a felony; escept the following persons 
may engage in activities included in the parctice 
of medicine subject to circumstances and limitations 
stated: 
(5) any individual administering a domestic or 
family remedy including those persons engaged in the 
sale of vitamins, health food, or health food 
supplements, herb or other products of nature, 
except drugs or medicines for which an authorized 
prescription is required by law. 
The appellant respectfully contends that the foregoing sub-section 
(5) of 58-12-30 £.£.A. "clearly covers" the factual data of the instant case 
for the following specific reasens: 
1. Only 58-12-30 U.C.A. "clearly covers" the act of: "practicing 
medicine without a license", as required by Ogden City v. 
McLaughlin, Supra. 
2. The very wording of the exceptions that the Utah Legislature 
has made at sub-section (5) and (6) of 58-12-30 tJ.C^ .A. is 
clear and convincing evidence of the indisputable fact the 
Utah Legislature did not: 
(a) INTEND...that "practicing medicine without a license 
to be prosecuted as a criminal offense, per se, But 
(b) The Utah Legislature - under 58-12-30 U.C.A. 
1. expressly accorded specific circumstances under which 
"persons may engage in activities included in the 
practice of medicine...subject to the circumstances 
and limitations stated" (e.g. sub-section (5) cited at 
length on the proceeding page). 
Thus, it would appear, abundantly clear, that by the Trial Court at pages 3 
and 4 of the Trail Transcript "Granting" the Prosecution's "motion" to 
"Amend" the "Information" (to convert the mere difinition of the term... 
"practice of medicine" at 58-12-28 (_4) (A) U..C.A. into a "crime" and being 
"restricted" to 58-12-28 (_4) (A) U..C.A. constituted an act on the part of the 
Court by which it divested itself of subject-matter Jurisdiction of the 
alleged offense of "practicing medicine without a lecense" since "restricting" 
the prosecution to jtt-12-28^  (4.) (A) U.C.A. the Court "restricted" (T. 3-4) the 
prosecution to State Statutory provisions. 
1. Which does not "clearly cover" a criminal offense. Nor, 
2. Invoke the jurisdiction of the Trial Court as to the subject-
matter of the offense alleged to be "criminal" and is 
"clearly covered" (Ogden City v. McLaughlin, Supra), under the 
applicable but not used controlling provisions of 58-12-30 £.C^ A.. 
and 58-12-30(5) £.C.A. in the instant case. 
And in such specific regard, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit has said: 
"Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived nor conferred by 
consent of the parties", United States v. Siviglia, 686 F.2d 
832 (10th Cir. 1981). 
And the Supreme Court has said that when, as occurred in the instant case, a 
Judegment is rendered by a Court without its jurisdiction having been invoked 
accordingly its judgement "must be declared a nullity". See: State v. Teleford, 
72 P.2d 626. The absence of jurisdiction should be declared fatal to the 
validity of the conviction in the instant case. 
POINT III 
The Appellant was convicted without any evidence of his guilt and 
the State (Art. I Sec. 7, Const, of Utah) and Federal (5th and 14th Amendments) 
guarantee of "Due Process" was violated thereby. 
To substantiate the foregoing contention the appellant respect-
fully submits that his conviction of "operating a pyramid scheme" and "practicing 
medicine without a license" were effected without at least some showing of 
evidence as was attempted in Petree where "recurring dreams" compelled him 
to call his sister in Las Vegas, Nevada and the haunting effects of the 
murdered girl led to Petree1s prosecution or murder (State v. Petree, 639 
P.2d 453 (1983) and "some evidence" in the instant case, when the lawless 
tape recorded oral communications os the appellant's "set-up" visit at the 
request of Rosamunde Krolls (T. 45) was working fully with "Investigator" 
Frank Wall (T. 53 151, 158) is not "used at all" consistent with 
Silverthorne Lumbar Company v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). There 
remains no evidnetairy support for the appellant's conviction whatsoever. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that when, as in the instant 
case, a conviction has been effected without evidence of guilt, Due Process 
of Law as guaranteed under the 5th and 14 Amendments to to Federal Constitution. 
SEE: Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960) 
Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1962) 
Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) 
Johnson v. Florida, 391 U.S. 596 (1968) 
Harris v. United States, 404 U.S. 1232 (1972) 
Vochon v. New Hampshire, 414 U.S. 478 (1974) 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) 
At 76-1-501 U..C..A. the Legislature of the State of Utah requires 
proof as to "each element" of the crime charges as follows: 
76-1-501 U/C^A. Presumption of innocence "element of the offense" 
A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed innocent until 
each element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof the defendant shall 
be acquitted. 
The Supreme Court also requires "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" 
as to "each element of the offense charged" (accord: _IN RE WINSHIP, 397 U.S. 
358 (1970). 
However, when such constitutionally required "burden of proof" 
is applied to the factual data of the instant case, and the following 
inescapable conclusions are apparent: 
1. That the appellant1 s conduct ijs not shown by the Record 
in the instant case to have exceeded the scope of the 
exception accorded by the Utah Legislature which expressly 
approves the "home remedy" that is encompassed within the 
appellant's "oxyogen" and/or "hydrogen peroxide" suggested 
remedies that are definitely not required to be obtained 
by an "authorized prescription required by law" and 
therefore under the provisions od sub-section (5) 
of 58-12-30 £.C.A. the recorded conduct of the appellant 
at the residence of Mrs. Krolls (T. 45) cannot in any way 
be declared to be illegal, 
2. Nor can it be reasonable concluded that any cchnduct on the 
part of the appellant constituted any possible violation of 
the ambiguous content of 76-6a-3 £*£«A. under which the appellant 
was convicted of "operating a pyramid scheme" (which remains 
yet to be shown to have really existed at law, if in fact 
there is such a "scheme". 
3. The appellant was therefore convicted without any evidence 
of his guilt and the State and Federal Constitutional guarantee 
of Due Process of Law was violated thereby. 
ACCORD: Thompson v. City of Louisville/ Supra 
Garner v. Louisiana, Supra, 
Adderly v. Florida, Supra, 
Johnson v. Florida, Supra, 
Harris y. United States, Supra, 
Jackson v. Virginia, Supra. 
POINT IV 
The provisions of 76-6a-3 £.C.A. are viod for vagueness and are 
unconstitutionally insufficient based upon which the appellant's conviction 
can be allowed to stand. 
The appellant relies upon the majority decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in its condemnation or the former (repealed) provisions 
of 76-12-1(5) U..C.A. as "unconstitutional" wherin the late Justice Douglas 
said, inter alia: 
"The State Legislature tried to cover so much that 
it suceeded in covering nothing effectively." 
cf. Musser v. State of Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948) 
But at the heart of the Musser are the following words which 
specifically condemned sub-section (5) of the aforesaid repealed provisions 
of 76-12-1: 
"For this statute to be valid it cannot be so vague 
that it fails adequately to define the offense or to 
give reasonable standards for determining guilt, 
otherwise it would have violated the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, cf. 
Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948). 
Applied to the instant case the appellant was convicted of violating the 
provisions of 76-6a-3 U/C..A- which are worded: 
76-6a-3 U..C.A. (1) a person may not organize, establish 
promote any pyramid scheme, 
(2) a conviction under this chapter is prima facia 
evidnece of a violation of Section 13-11-4 The Utah 
Consumer Sale Practice Act. 
(3) any violation of this chapter constitutes.a violation 
of Section 13-11-4 the Utah Consumers Sales Practice 
Act. 
(4) All civil violations of this chapter shall be 
investigated and prosecuted as prescribed by the 
Utah Consumer Sales Practice Act. 
At 76-6a-2(4) a "pyramid scheme" is defined: 
"Pyramid scheme" means any sales device, or plan under 
which a person gives consideration to another person 
in exchange for compensation or the right to recieve 
compensation which is derived primarily from 
introduction of other persons into the sales device or plan 
rather than from the sale of goods, services or other 
property. 
From the foregoing intermingle ambiguous substance of 76-6a-3 tJ.C^ .A. 
and its vague (undefined reference to any specific subject-matter of 
13-11-4 of the "Utah Consumers Sales Practice Act") and then and there: 
1. Not spelling out the elements of 13-11-4 U..C.A. nor 
2. The "definition" of J3-11-4. U..C.A. 
But such inclusion of such vague and ambiguous reference to 13-11-4 
within the scope of 76-6a-3 U.C.A. renders such statutory provisions itself 
(i.e. 76-6a-3 U.C.A. 
(1) Without a rational and complete "definition" 
as required under Musser v. State of Utah, 
333 U.S. 95 (1948), and 
(2) With a "standard for determining guilt" as 
required under Musser v. State of Utah, supra. 
And for such specific reasons the provisions of 76-6a-3 U.C.A. are totally 
viod for vagueness and their unconstitutional content should be declared 
fatal to the validity of the appellant's conviction for "operating a pyramid 
scheme". 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly and consistently placed 
very special emphasis on "Fundamental Fairness" (see; e.g. Walker v. State 
of Utah, 624 P.2d 687 /Utah 1981/) and declared the "Prosecution has a duty 
to see that justice is done" (Cordianna v. Morris, 594 P.2d 874 /1979/) 
and relative to the inherent "ignoble part" (Omstead v. United States, 277 
U.S. 438 /1928/) and "Ignoble short-cut ot a conviction" (Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643 /1962/) that was admittedly taken by Frank Wall (T. 53, 151, 158) 
the United States Supreme Court has said that: 
"While prosecutors may strike hard blows, they 
are not at liberty to strike low blows". 
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 98 (1935). 
And while the appellant was not entitled to "a perfect trial", 
Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 601 (1953), he was entitled to "a fair 
trial" under Article I, Section 12, Constitution of Utah, and the 5th and 
14th Amendments to the Federal Constitution. 
Because the Trial Courts Jurisdiction was not invoked as to the 
erroneous an inapplicable statutory provisions (58-12-28(4)(A) IJ.C.A.) in 
light of the controlling and applicable provisions of 58-12-30 £.£*A. 
having been circumvented the Trial Courts Judgement without jurisdiction 
should be declared "a nullity" (State v. Teleford, 72 P.2d 626). 
Because no reasonable ascertainable of evidence of the appellant*s 
guilt as to either of the two (2) charges is a matter of record. It should 
follow at law therefrom that the convictions of thh appellant should not be 
allowed to stand if "Fair Play" is indeed "at the heart of Due Prosses of 
Law". Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954), and "Justice must satisfy the 
appearance of Justice" Offut v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1955). 
The Appellant therefore respectfully submits that his convictions 
should be reversed and his case remanded to the District Court for a dismissal 
of the charges in the interest of a fair administration of "even handed 
justice". 
respectfully submitted, 
Appellant Pro Se 
